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Limitless Horizons of Limited Policies of Insurance
Harry H. Lipsig*
L IMITED POLICIES have limitless horizons due to the selfishness of
insurers. Why should insurers accept settlement offers that are
close to the policy limits? After all, in most instances the insurers have
nothing to lose except the insureds' money. Gambling with insureds'
funds has led many to suggest that insurers be absolutely liable for all
excess judgments subsequent to a rejection of settlement.
Because of its far reaching dictum, Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.
of New Haven, Conn.,' is of central importance in any discussion of
an insurer's liability for refusal to settle. Although the idea of im-
posing absolute liability is not new,2 it has yet to be adopted in any
jurisdiction.3 The court in Crisci indicates, however, that in the ap-
propriate case it will hold that whenever an insurer rejects an offer of
settlement within the policy limits, it will be absolutely liable for any
judgment, even if it is not within those limits. It will always be in the
interest of the insured to settle within the policy limits whenever there
is a possibility that an excess judgment will be returned. The court
also states, in this regard:
... in light of the common knowledge that settlement is one of the
usual methods by which an insured receives protection under a
liability policy, it may not be unreasonable for an insured who
purchases a policy with limits to believe that a sum of money equal
to the limits is available and will be used so as to avoid liability on
his part with regard to any covered accident. In view of such ex-
pectation an insurer should not be permitted to further its own
interests by rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits
unless it is also willing to absorb losses which may result from its
failure to settle. 4
The reasons given in support of such a rule are as follows: (1)
The rule is simple to state and apply and eliminates the necessity for
a decision as to whether the refusal was reasonable5 ; (2) It also elim-
inates the possibility that the insurer will gamble with the insured's
money when an offer is made close to the policy limits6 ; (3) It is sug-
gested that an absolute liability rule might not increase the burden on
* Member of the Bar of the City of New York; former Director, International Acad-
emy of Trial Lawyers; etc.
1 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P. 2d 173 (1967).
2 An amendment to the insurance law was introduced in the New York legislature
in 1948. The bill was never reported out of committee.
3 Bad faith or negligence are the current standards used to determine an insurer's
liability for refusal to settle.
4 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17, 426 P. 2d 173, 177 (1967).
5 Id.
6 Id.
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insurers. "The size of the judgment recovered in the personal injury
action when it exceeds the policy limits although not conclusive, fur-
nishes an inference that the value of the claim is the equivalent of the
amount of the judgment and that acceptance of an offer was the most
reasonable method of dealing with the claim" 7; (4) It is elementary
justice to require that the insured who would reap the benefits if a
judgment is less than the settlement offer, should also suffer the detri-
ment if a judgment is more than the settlement offers
Some of the court's arguments in support of the rule are inadequate.
While it states that it is always in the insured's interest to settle within
the policy limits whenever there is a possibility of an excess judgment,!
it fails to balance the insured's interest in low rates against his interest
in complete coverage.
Prior to its adoption by any court or legislature, a number of
questions with respect to the proposed rule should be resolved. To
what extent, would a rule of absolute liability increase insurance rates?
Would people tend to buy low limit policies? Would it encourage un-
founded claims?
Direct Action Against the Insurer
Although, when considered in its entirety, there may be some unex-
plored difficulties with the proposed rule, one important aspect, the
right of direct action by the injured party against the insurer, has re-
ceived some consideration and has been implemented in a number
of jurisdictions. It will be argued herein that the injured party at the
very least should have the right of direct action against the insurer
for wrongful refusal to settle in all jurisdictions.
Injured parties have succeeded in bringing direct actions against
the insurer in a number of jurisdictions for failing to bargain and
negotiate in good faith or in a reasonable manner. Whenever policies
have included provisions allowing for such actions, or whenever, ac-
cording to the law of the particular jurisdiction, there have been valid
and proper assignments of the insured's cause of action, or, more re-
cently, whenever state insurance statutes have been so interpreted by
their courts to allow such suits, the injured party has been successful
in bringing direct action suits.
Some cases have held that if the insurance policy gives the injured
party the insured's rights against the insurer, these would include the
right to bring an action for bad faith or negligent refusal to settle. In
Auto Mutual Indemnity Company v. Shaw,1° the injured claimant re-
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 134 Fla. 815, 184 S. 852 (1938).
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LIMITED POLICIES OF INSURANCE
covered a judgment in excess of the policy limits, and it appeared there
was some question as to the good faith of the insurer in refusing settle-
ment. The policy had a clause which provided in pertinent part: "where
the judgment cannot be collected against the insured, the judgment
creditor is vested with the insured's rights against the insurer." Here
it was held that if the insured could collect for the insurer's refusal to
negotiate in good faith, so could the injured party.
A similar policy provision in Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mutual Hail
Ins. Association," was invoked to support a suit by the injured party
against the insurer for bad faith refusal to compromise, after a judg-
ment against the insured in excess of the policy limits was returned un-
satisfied. The policy provided: in case an execution against the insured
on final judgment is returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor has a
right of action against the insurer to the same extent the insured would
have had if he had paid such judgment. In this action, however, it was
held that the insured did not have a right of action against the insurer
for bad faith settlement and therefore neither did the injured party.
It is obvious that few policies will contain a clause entitling the
judgment creditor to proceed against the insurer directly. Absent a
specific provision, in the past it has been consistently held that the in-
jured party may not sue the insurance carrier directly for alleged wrong-
ful failure to settle. 12 The following reasons are often given by courts in
refusing to allow such suits: (1) There is no privity of contract between
the insurer and the injured party at the time of the alleged wrong. The
insurer's duty in respect to settlement negotiations arises out of the
relationship created by the contract and injured party has no such
relationship to the insurer as he is not a party to the contract13 ; (2)
The injured party is not a third party beneficiary of the insurance con-
tract 14 ; (3) The injured party was not damaged when the judgment
exceeded the amount offered in the proposed settlement"5; (4) The in-
jured party cannot be permitted to appropriate the tort claim which the
insured may have against the insurance company.'"
Assigning the Cause of Action
By assigning the insured's cause of action, some jurisdictions have
circumvented the dilemma faced by the injured and insured parties
when the injured party has recovered a judgment in excess of the
It 101 F. 2d 982 (8th Cir. 1939).
12 Francis v. Newton, 75 Ga. App. 341, 43 S.E. 2d 282 (1947).
13 Seguros Tepeyec, S.A., v. Bostrom, 347 F. 2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965) rehearing denied,
360 F. 2d 154 (1966).
14 Browdy v. Statewide Insurance Company, 56 Misc. 2d 610, 289 N.Y.S. 2d 711
(1968).
15 Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P. 2d 576 (1967).
16 Id.
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policy limits and the insured has a cause of action against the insurer
for bad faith or negligent refusal to settle. Although not all jurisdictions
have recognized the assignability of these causes of action, it is well
settled in those that have that these assignments are not against public
policy.
17
The law of assignments in most jurisdictions provides that all
choses in action except torts are assignable.18 There is a great deal
of disagreement as to whether the insured's cause of action for wrong-
ful refusal to settle arises from tort or contract. It appears that many
jurisdictions would claim it arises in tort19; however, in Smith v. Tran-
sit Casualty Company,20 the court stated:
Although the cause of action, if any, sounds primarily in tort, the
duty owed to use ordinary care in settlement negotiations also
constitutes an implied contractual warranty in its policy to exercise
at all times due care when utilizing the expertise in the exclusive
control of investigating and defending claims against the insured.
Thus, an action based on breach of this duty also sounds in con-
tract, and may therefore be properly assigned.2 '
Applying California law, the court in Communale v. Traders and Gen-
eral Insurance Company22 held that an action for damages in excess
of the policy limits based on an insurer's wrongful failure to settle was
assignable whether the action was considered as sounding tort or con-
tract.
"The rights of the judgment creditor under liability policy are
purely derivative arising no higher than those of the assured." 23 The
injured party as the assignee of the insured's cause of action for wrong-
ful failure to settle is said to stand in the shoes of the insured-assignor.
The insurance carrier's file is open to the injured claimant.24 The in-
jured claimant also has the right to trial by jury.25 Insurer can assert
its defenses as fully against the assignee as against the insured and
furthermore, payment of any judgment by the insurer would discharge
the insurer of any further obligation and forever bar any action by the
injured party.
17 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E. 2d 809
(1967).
18 Kans. Gen. Stat., 1949 § 60-401.
19 Dillingham v. Tri-State Insurance Company, 214 Tenn. 592, 381 S.W. 2d 914
(1964).
20 281 F. Supp. 661 (D.C. Tex. 1967).
21 Id., at 668.
22 50 Cal. 2d 659, 328 P. 2d 198 (1958).
23 Atlantic City v. American Casualty Insurance Company, 254 F. Supp. 396, 398
(D.C. N.J. 1966).
24 Chitty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 36 F.R.D. 37 (E.D.
So. Car.).
25 Supra n. 22.
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The consideration for the assignment by the insured very often is
a covenant by the judgment creditor not to execute beyond the policy
limit. "This is a convenient way for the insured to fully satisfy the
injured party, and in the case of an insolvent insured it may net the
injured party far more than the existing judgment against the insured
can do." 26 In the Critz case, 27 the Court held that the covenant not to
execute did not destroy or eliminate damages; however, in the Smith
case, where the insured also assigned his cause of action for wrongful
refusal to settle to the injured party, the Court stated:
Under Texas law, one of the requirements for asserting a cause of
action against an insurer for negligent failure to settle is that the
insured must have actually paid the judgment in favor of claimant
before seeking indemnity from the insurer, the rationale of such
rule being that the insured is in no way damaged until he pays
money.28 s
A note given by the insured in this action to the injured party which
purported to be payment of the judgment, was found not to be bona fide
and would not enable insured to avoid the Texas rule of prepayment
before suit could be brought by the insured against the insurer, but
there did exist a valid cause of action for $5.00 since there was a $5.00
payment in the judgment and the injured party could properly assert
this under the assignment.2 9
Harris v. Standard Accident Insurance Company,30 recognized
that New York law requires proof of actual loss to support recovery
by the insured or his estate for the insurer's bad faith failure to settle.
In Young v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Penn.,3 1 the court
held that where the insured becomes insolvent after rendition of the
excess judgment, is discharged in bankruptcy, and the judgment is
cancelled, the trustees in bankruptcy of the assured may recover for
bad faith refusal to settle and may recover not only the amount actually
paid by the insolvent insured on the judgment but the entire amount of
the judgment. The discharges were held to be personal to an insolvent
insured affording a defense to subsequent prosecutions against him as
an individual on the claim. The estates in bankruptcy were held not
to be affected by the discharge in bankruptcy, and therefore the cause
of action against the insurer could be validly assigned to the injured
26 Peterson, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence
Rule, 18 Stanford L. Rev. 475 (1965).
27 Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1965).
28 Supra n. 20 at 662.
29 The court also entered a declaratory judgment stipulation that any future pay-
ments made by the insured in excess of the limits should be reimbursable by the
insurer, if the insurer had wrongfully refused to settle.
30 191 F. Supp. 538 (S-D. N.Y. 1961).
31 416 F. 2d 906 (?d Cir. 1969).
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (1)
party by the trustees. One can easily see the importance of allowing the
injured claimant to proceed against the insurer as opposed to the insured
in this type of situation.
Atlantic City v. Caproni American Casualty Company,3 2 highlights
both the advantages and disadvantages of using assignment as the
means by which an injured party may sue the insurer for wrongful
refusal to settle. Plaintiff, the injured party, recovered a judgment
against Atlantic City in the amount of $600,000.00 for personal injuries.
A liability policy was issued to Atlantic City by American Casualty
with limits of $100,000.00 was to be contributed voluntarily by the in-
surer and $250,000.00 by the insured. "When the insurer rejected this
proposal, the insured, recognizing the insurer's exclusive control over
settlement negotiations and trial under the terms of its policy, inde-
pendently executed, prior to trial, an agreement with the injured party,
whereby the City settled its liability with him for $250,000.00 and in
consideration therefor partially assigned to him a share in any cause
of action it might have against the insurer to recover the excess over the
policy limits.
The defendant insurer moved for an order dismissing his complaint
for failure to assert a claim, relying on Chittick v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 1.  which held that a judgment creditor had
no standing to sue the insurer directly. The injured party asserted that
he was the real party in interest by virtue of a partial assignment from
the insured. This court distinguishes Chittick on the basis that the com-
plaint there alleged "subrogation to the rights of the assured by oper-
ation of law." In Chittick, the court stated:
It is this right of action of the insured that the plaintiff claims has,
in some manner, become vested in her. No assignment, substitution
or other transfer by the insured has been suggested but the term
"subrogated" is used in the complaint.3 4
The court in Atlantic City held: "Clearly Chittick intimates that a
vested interest by way of assignment, as in the instant case, would dem-
onstrate a suable right in an assignee and take the case outside of its
ruling." -17 Here the court held that the injured party had a real and
mature claim for damages and the court denied the motion to dismiss
the complaint as to the injured party.
The assignment which was made before trial but after the alleged
wrongful refusal was not void because premature or because contrary
to public policy. Assignment was not a breach of the insured's promise
32 Supra n. 23.
33 170 F. Supp. 276 (D.C. Del. 1958).
34 Id. at 279.
3-5 Supra n. 23 at 398.
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to cooperate with the defense, since its validity turned on a prior breach
of contract by the company, after which the insured no longer owed
the company any duty. Assignment afforded the injured party the means
by which he could sue the insurer. Of course, the great disadvantage
to assignment is that its presence greatly increases the chances of col-
lusion between the insured and the injured party thereby impairing
settlement negotiations.
As previously indicated, not all jurisdictions have recognized or
even passed upon the question of the assignability of the insured's cause
of action for wrongful refusal to settle. A recent development in Con-
necticut using one of its insurance laws as the basis eliminates the
need for assignment as it permits the judgment creditor a direct right
of action against the insurer for wrongful refusal to settle.
Need for Direct Action Suits
In Bourget v. Government Employees Insurance Company,30 plain-
tiff, the injured party, recovered a judgment of $94,000.00. Insurance
coverage amounted to only $20,000.00. Plaintiff, unsuccessful in collect-
ing the balance of it from the insured, brought an action against GEICO,
the insurer, pursuant to CGSA 38-175 for wrongful refusal to settle.
This statute subrogated the injured party to all of the insured's rights
against the insurer whenever a judgment was obtained and remained
unsatisfied for more than 30 days.37
The lower court stated:
Furthermore, this court has specifically held that a judgment cred-
itor may bring a direct action against the debtor's insurer to re-
cover the excess over the policy limits. Turgeon v. Shelby Mutual
Plate Glass & Casualty Company, 112 F. Supp. 355 (D. Conn. 1953)
(Smith, D.J.). In Turgeon, Judge Smith stated:
It may be conceded, as defendant contends, that plaintiffs, even if
treated as creditor third-party beneficiaries, could recover on the
policy itself only the policy limits. The plaintiffs, however, base
their claims on the statute which by its terms subrogates them to
all the insured's rights against the defendant. Insured's right of
action in negligence ordinarily would not be assignable to plain-
tiffs, but there is no reason to doubt the power of the legislature to
transfer this right if it chose to do so.
Its primary purpose in the act in question was to provide protec-
tion for those injured by judgment proof insureds. We cannot say
whether it had specifically in mind the insured's right of action for
negligence against the insurer as well as his right of action for
breach of the contract to pay up to a specified amount on behalf
of the insured. Both were, however, potential assets of the insured
36 48 F.R.D. 29 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
37 Conn. Gen. Stat. Anno. C.38 § 175.
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and one may as well be marshalled for the satisfaction of the in-
sured's judgment debt to the injured party as the other.
The language of the statute is broad enough to cover both.38
The court held therefore that plaintiff's complaint stated a good cause
of action against the defendant GEICO.
On appeal, GEICO argued that the legislative history of this sec-
tion did not indicate that the legislature was concerned with verdicts
over the policy limits. The court held that courts are required to fol-
low the plain language of the statute. In Barr v. US, the court went on:
But if Congress has made a choice of language which fairly brings
a given situation within a statute, it is unimportant that the par-
ticular application may not have been contemplated by the legis-
lator.39
The primary evidence of legislative intent is always the language of
the statute. It is the language which determines the rule by which
those who read it must determine their conduct. Only if the language
is unclear or ambiguous should the reader resort to legislative history.
40
In Bourget, the court notes that there is little authority from other
jurisdictions on this point since Connecticut seems to be one of the few
states to have such a statute.4 1 It is unfortunate that the court is cor-
rect for the Connecticut statute eliminates many of the problems in-
volved with the assignability of the insured's cause of action. It elimi-
nates the necessity of determining whether the cause of action sounds
in tort or in contract, which frequently precludes assignment, and it
also avoids the necessity of finding a way to circumvent the prepayment
rules which exist in many jurisdictions.
Another approach for allowing direct actions is for the courts
to recognize the injured party as a third party beneficiary of the in-
surance contract. One of the implicit terms in any liability insurance
policy is that the insurer will attempt to negotiate a settlement in good
faith or in a reasonable manner. This is a right vested in not only
the insured but also in the injured party. The "Motor Vehicle Financial
Security Act" of the State of New York prohibits any person from
operating any motor vehicle without liability coverage. The declared
purpose of this action is as follows:
The legislature is concerned over the rising tolls of motor vehicle
accidents and the suffering and loss thereby inflicted. The legis-
lature determines that it is a matter of grave concern that motor-
ists shall be financially able to respond in damages for their negli-
s 287 F. Supp. 108, 110 (D.C. Conn. 1968).
39 342 U.S. 83, 90 (1945).
40 Safeway Store, Inc. v. Arnall, 196 F. 2d 510, 513 (Emer. Ct. App. 1952), judgment
vacated on other grounds 344 U.S. 803 (1952).
41 Supra n. 36 at 36.
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gent acts, so that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents may
be recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon
them. The legislature finds and declares that the public interest
can best be served in satisfying the insurance requirements of this
article by private enterprise operating in a competitive market to
provide proof of financial security through the methods prescribed
herein.4 2
Under well-settled and long-recognized principles of law, when two
parties enter into an agreement for the benefit of a third, the latter has
the right to bring suit for breach of that agreement. Why shouldn't
these principles apply to insurance contracts? It has been held in some
jurisdictions that the injured party is the third party beneficiary of an
insurance contract for purposes of bringing a direct action suit for
wrongful refusal to settle,43 and it is strongly suggested that other
jurisdictions follow suit.
Conclusion
The proposed rule of absolute liability, as stated in Crisci,4 4 is hav-
ing its impact in all jurisdictions. It raises a number of questions which
should be carefully considered and studied before its adoption. At the
very least, however, all jurisdictions should move rapidly to allow in-
jured parties the right of direct action against the insurer. The article
offers a number of approaches for allowing such suits and it is strongly
urged that they be considered by all jurisdictions seeking "the limit-
less horizons of limited policies."
42 Vehicle and Traffic Law of New York § 310.
43 Supra n. 23.
44 Supra n. 1.
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